As indicated in the Post on the Logistics Performance Index (2010) on this T L Blog; between leading performers from the Developed world – such as Singapore and Germany – and, the poorest performers in Developing markets there is a significant middle ground. Best practice from conventional logistics tends to see supply chains as converging to a homogenous operational model and these markets are far from being such smooth operators. This is Transformational Logistics territory and the opportunity is to develop operating models that can cope with highly fragmented and far from homogenous markets featuring modern and traditional approaches across all sectors. These are the Emerging markets that are experiencing fast growth but have to deal with a number of significant challenges from governance to infrastructure, the lack of a professional logistics culture and, the absence of fully transparent supply chains across often highly contrasting geographies within their own borders.

Russia is a classic example of those high potential markets characterised – in logistics terms – by poor infrastructure and facilities; hybrid supply chains combining traditional and modern practice and, facing all manner of operational challenges, often opaque business practices and macro level economic volatility. Russia is one of the so called BRIC economies but has, in many analysts eyes, failed to match consistently the growth dynamics of the rest of this stellar group. Mind you, though Russia was hit hardest by the impact of the 2008-9 global depression – an oil price collapse from $140 to $45 per barrel when Russia needs c$75 for a balanced budget was a severe blow – it has returned to an estimated 7 per cent GDP growth in a dramatic turnaround. Here, we explore the logistics challenge for Russia and highlight how  T L could be a catalyst for a wide range of logistics and supply chain initiatives. Russia – unlike Africa and the need for simply modal solutions or, India and China with their huge domestic markets – has the potential to become the hub between Asia and Europe and this makes for a different set of challenges and priorities.

Eleven time zones is just the start ...

Back in 1915, the Tsars Army, as Norman Stone (1975) illustrates, were far better supplied than conventional wisdom would allow. Even Lincoln noted that Russia, in 1916, had grain to spare and the Germans were wary of the stockpiles of most miltary equipment. Yet, each bullet fired by a Russian soldier had to travel 4,000 kms from source to the front and, each artillery shell was transported 6,500 kms from manufacturer to the guns. It was more efficient to import these shells from Baltic sources than to move them from Krivoy Rog in the South of this huge country. Then, there was General Winter and rasputitsa (quagmire) to contend with for Russian and enemy troops alike. In Finnish, a similar word rospuutto means “roadlessness”. In the end, as the guns fell silent because the supply lines were gridlocked, the troops were reduced to fighting with bayonets and bare hands. Russia has always been a major logistics challenge from Peter the Great to Napoleon; World War 1 to the Revolution and Civil War; throughout the Soviet years and, into the open market era.

Russia, with 17.1 million square kilometres land mass, is the world’s largest country in terms of area; 75 per cent is in Asia. There are 11 time zones to contend with; each with hugely different geographical characteristics, cultural and, climatic features. The urban share of the population is 73 per cent (2005) including 13 cities with over 1 million inhabitants (Moscow, St Petersburg, Chelyabinsk, Ekateringburg, Kazan, Nizhny Novgorod, Novosibirsk, Omsk, Perm, Rostov-on-Don, Samara, Ufa and Volgogorod). Poor infrastructure in all modes combining with a challenging business culture (more inclined to test rather than comply with regulations) makes leverage of vast potential difficult and opportunity cost a real issue. The Global Corruption Report, the Human Development Index and, the Logistics Performance Index (2010) provide useful background to this business context where bribery or krysha (literally roof) was estimated by a Report from Transparency International Report (2009) to total an estimated $300 billion a year, about 18% of GDP.

Transformational Logistics is relevant to the middle ground on the LPI. Equally, T L can be a useful catalyst for those economies that are in transition from collapse or dislocation caused by natural disasters, warfare or, economic meltdown. When the Berlin Wall fell and, the Soviet Union disintegrated the supply chains of the Command Economy were early casualties and, the Economic medicine of the Washington Consensus – there was no alternative (supposedly) – sent industrial behemoths to the wall and the economy into a tailspin. It is hard to overestimate the impact of the fall of the Berlin Wall and, the liberalisation in China. These are huge economies whose markets had stood apart from the mainstream for decades. In the case of Russia this moment triggered a highly polarised debate. The Russian Economy from Rags to Riches (Sizov, 1995) and the Coming Russian Boom (1996) tell get rich quick tales of huge opportunity. Then, Capitalism Russian style (Gustafson) tempers the enthusiasm as does Legacies of Command (Ericsson, 2009). In fact, many saw the shock therapy of sudden privatisation as the Sale of the Century (Freeland, 2005) opening the door to McMafia (Glenny2009) and another book described Russia’s market economy as a bad case of predatory capitalism. So, was it all a False Dawn (Gray, 2002) and, no more than an Empires new clothes (Clark, 1995)? This is a massive story and a complex one. So, what lessons are there to be learned for Logistics and Supply Chain thinking and practice?

Whichever way we look at Russia, by 1992, GDP was recording a 15 per cent fall and, didn’t reach Soviet levels until 1997. The costs and dislocations of the First World War created a power vacuum that Lenin and the Bolsheviks exploited; the same challenges and opportunities opened up as the Soviet system collapsed. As Stiglitz (2002) points out: seldom before has any country deliberately set out to go from a situation where government controlled virtually every aspect of the economy to one where markets decide. Unfortunately, it is rarely so simple as an alignment of prices, property and profits. And in logistics terms, the need for solutions, insights into best practice and, the skills to deliver would soon highlight a major constraint. There was a need for a new type of innovation and entrepreneurship – not just the type used for circumventing red tape!

Structurally, the Soviet legacy and transition was made more complex by the dependence on heavy industry. Employment in this sector was 30.3 per cent of total employment in 1991 (compared to 19 per cent in the USA) and most of this was in heavily populated urban centres – often located in the colder and more inaccessible regions for security reasons. Transportation and energy costs were rarely a consideration and, proximity to consumers was not even a requirement. This was exacerbated by an economy based on barter – the exchange of goods and services – rather than straight accounting practice. This was extremely complex and often triggered a series of promissory notes (veksels – based on the German for bills of exchange) that operated as a system of offsets between companies. So, you produced widgets and were paid in, say, building materials. Then, you would build facilities that bore no relation to actual need.

The three Fat Boys (tri tolstyaka) – Gazprom (the natural gas monopoly – which produces over 23 per cent of global output); RAO UES (the electricity monopoly) and, MPS (the state railways) were the major players in this barter or virtual economy. These behemoths regularly complained that they collected less than 10 per cent of their revenues in cash. How on earth could an effective and efficient tax regime be created under these conditions? And these “virtual” economic conditions at the high end were exacerbated by the explosion of the shadow economy on the street. Very little research has been done into how the logistics map of Russia dealt with this challenge of a switch from security determined supply side location to a market led process of setting things up close to actual demand. This takes time and, the shadow economy was simply faster to react.

Misha Glenny (2009; Chrystia Freeland (2005) and others have covered this in some detail. It was a combination of the Sale of the Century and, the creation of a Loophole Economy. Not a great place to achieve the objectives of the IMF and the rest. Economic volatility continued into the 00’s and then came the impact of the Global Recession in 2008-9. National Banking reserves fell from $600 billion to $180 billion almost overnight; 43 Banks closed down and, interest rates shot to over 20 per cent. Then, there is the volatility of oil and gas prices to complicate matters further. From 2007 to 2009 oil prices fluctuated wildly from a high of US$132.55 a barrel to a low of $41.53.

Meanwhile, Russia is adopting a more assertive, confident world-stage stance, Bill Emmott at The Times argued that Russia’s strengths “hang solely on a high oil price … Russia is no longer ‘Upper Volta with missiles.’ It is Saudi Arabia with nukes, an oil-dependent country in which power and wealth are concentrated in a small ruling elite, except that in Russia’s case it is, at least, not hereditary. Given the size of its population, a better comparison would admittedly be Egypt, a dictatorship with rigged elections and a muzzled media, if only Egypt had large oil reserves.” In terms of Logistics the volatility of the oil price and, the dependence of the Economy on it makes for weak incentives to diversify – which would grow a wider spread of logistics and supply chain services. Mind you, the Olympic Games at Sochi and the highly probable winning of the Football World Cup for 2018 will fast forward many of the pressing infrastructure developments that are needed to balance the economy.

This has been an all too brief summary of the transition years but imagine the starting point for a modern and functioning logistics platform and, the challenge that such volatility and economic distortions would create for all but the big industry players. Take the China trade which was roughly $1.5 billion in 2009 with the largest proportion of Chinese goods moving to Russia via the EU’s supply chain networks rather than by the more logical overland routes. Mind you, these figures are somewhat distorted because a significant proportion of so-called EU products are, in fact, made of Chinese components under EU brand labels.

This is not fertile soil for small enterprise; which has had a significant impact on Agriculture and other industries that are vital to a diversified and sustainable economy. Neither is this a stable enough context to build a fully functioning logistics industry. There is much to be done with the logistics platform in Russia – in all modes. Here are some highlights:

  • Infrastructure. Russia laid down ambitious plans for infrastructure as a key part of the 2007 Plan for Russia to become the fifth-largest economy in the world by 2020.  Amid the post communist economic chaos, investment spending collapsed in the 1990s and only recovered to world averages by 2007. That year, German Gref, the economics minister at the time, announced plans to invest $1,000 bn (£695bn, 820bn€) on infrastructure. The Global crisis dislocated the plans and, a total of $8 billion earmarked for infrastructure from Vnesheconombank, the state development bank, went instead to bail out Rusal, the aluminium conglomerate and elsewhere. In parallel, other monies were diverted to social spending to alleviate hardship. The only projects that were ring fenced were $8bn allocated to Sochi for the Olympic Games 2014 amd $10bn for the far esatern regionahead of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (Apec) summit in Vladivostok. Sochi is planned t showcase post-communist Russia in the same way that the summer Olympics showcased China in 2008. Up to $5bn will come from the Government and the rest will come from the major Corporations such as Gazprom, the natural gas monopoly and Rusal.The infrastructure challenge is daunting. Despite Russia’s size (11 timezones) its railway network is half that of the USA and freight trains crawl at an average 25mph. The paved road network is under 10 per cent of the USA and, only 5 per cent of these are considered good quality.What does this mean in comparison with other Emerging countries? China spends 8 per cent of GDP versus Russia’s 4 to 5 per cent on infrastructure. One factor is the huge costs of construction. Moscow residents joke that the cost of a kilometre of MKAD, or Moscow ringroad, is equivalent to a kilometre of the Large Hadron Collider at Cern in Switzerland. There is a planned 415 mile highway between Moscow and St Petersburg; the first 27 miles of which is projected to cost $1.2 billion – and this will rise. A ringroad around St Petersburg – bear in mind the fact that St Petersburg is built on marshland – was budgeted to cost 57 bn roubles (£1.3bn, 1.5bn€) and has already risen by 370 per cent since 2006.  Finally, there is an issue on finance and foreign investment. In fact, over 80 per cent of the overall infrastructure spend is planned to come from private sources – in India this is 40 per cent. However, foreign investors are wary of taking the plunge on infrastructure projects when they witness projects like Sakhalin-2 oil and gas project – where Shell lost control to Gazprom in 2006. This does not inspire confidence.
  • Roads. The network stands at 933,000 kms carrying 5,700 tonnes per kms. Only 85 per cent of these surfaces are hard – which may have something to do with the fact that over 35,000 people are killed on Russian roads every year. Over 80 per cent of the imported goods are moved by truck and, internally FMCG and Retail are driving both the use of logistics and a dependency on road transport. Rail just has to improve its multi modal switching capacity to build market share – and improve the environmental impact.Aside of the infrastructure, we must consider trucking. Dominated by Sovtransavto in Soviet times, the market opened up possibilities and the groundswell for foreign goods built demand (80 per cent of activity was imports during the 90s and this has continued). Trucking has struggled with red tape and, as elsewhere in emerging and developing countries, corruption. As one commentator put it: “I don’t remember a year when the regulations have not changed!” and this is a recipe for problems and, unnecessary queues. In fact, in the 1990s trucking companies in neighbouring countries were able to grab significant market share for cross border moves.
  • Rail. Russia, with 87,000 kms of track is the second largest network after India and carries 1,801 billion tonnes of cargo per year. In addition, there are 63,000 kms of broad gauge rail that serves specific sectors but is not open for wider commercial use. Perhaps the biggest hope for Rail is the opening up of the Trans Siberian Railroad. A test cargo from Pusan to Helsinki took 16 days compared to 47 days by sea and, a DB pilot test registered 15 days from Beijing to Hamburg in 2008. More needs to be done to understand the ways to develop this land bridge for the Russian market as well as between Asia and the EU. However, current capacity on the Trans Siberian Railroad is no more than 300,000 containers per year – far too low. And, cross border and internal red tape leave many companies sticking with the status quo.Note. More than 90% of all goods transported by railway between Russia and China are Russia’s exports (timber, oil cargoes, fertilisers and ores); only about 8% is Chinese imports; and the remaining 2% is transit. These figures do not include goods received in Russia with foreign brand labels. These go to Russia via St. Petersburg.
  • Ports. Russian Ports processed 1.6 million containers in 2006 and a total of 154 million tonnes of goods – excluding oil. Compared with China’s more than 120 million TEUs or even India’s at 8.6 million TEUs – this is not much capacity. Maybe China is an atypical case; and India is a useful comparison on a per capita basis. However, Brazil handled 6.8 million TEUs in 2008 up from 2.4 million TEUs in 2000. This is a better comparison. Like Brazil, where Santos handles the bulk of container traffic, St Petersburg handles 90 per cent of this total and is the biggest container Port on the Baltic sea. Kalingrad, with 154,000 TEUs is second. This sector was remarkably unscathed by the impact of the Global crisis. There is significant progress in the strategic reconfiguration of the Ports sector. For example, Ports on the Black Sea are being re-focussed on different markets. Sochi – in the run up to the Winter Olympic Games of 2014 – is being switched to tourism and will be closed to commercial cargo from September 2010. Trade with Turkey is significant – in 2009 this stood at $3.2 billion in goods and $19.7 billion in gas – and, the idea is to build a purpose built trade hub to serve trade between the two countries. Sources suggest that this is best served with Kavkaz Port as a catalyst. This is even more urgent as the fruit and vegetable markets now focussed on Novorissisk Port are diverted because this Region is being designated as a place for Tourism. In terms of Ports, there is a long way to go for Russia to realise its potential to be the hub between Asia and Europe.
  • Inland waterways. Russia has 102,000 kms of inland waterways – the second of 165 countries in the world with inland rivers. However, in terms of logistics, the rivers run south to north when freight flows are heavily focussed from west to east. Inland waterways carried 3.6 per cent of Russian freight in 1991 and this had declined to 1.6 per cent by 2005. As logistics hubs are set up the opportunities for inland distribution centres and inland Ports should compliment other modes well.
  • Air. There are 1,260 airports (6th out of 247 listed countries) with varying levels of investment and many of them with regeneration projects in progress. For example, Sochi in readiness for the 2014 Winter Olympics. There are 26million air passengers per year (16th out of 164 listed) and there is limited use of air cargo for perishables and valuable items. It should be noted that Lufthansa has its main transport hub in Kazahstan these days so, there is tremendous scope for Russia to explore becoming a global hub for air transport of all types.
  • Multi modal operations. This is the Achilles heal. Russia does not integrate different modes effectively or efficiently. Facilities have to be set up in the right location. For example, in 1993 Westbound trade stood at 60,000 containers and Eastbound at 48,000 TEUs; by 2007 these numbers had increased to 215,000 TEUs for Westbound trade and, no more than 30,000 TEUs Eastbound or, 12 per cent of the traded volume. There are exceptions – Southern Regions such as Saratov; Volgogorad; Samara; Stavropol and Krasnodar are rich in seasonal products such as fruit and vegetables. Each sector has specialist requirements.
  • Pipelines. Many logistics studies leave this out of the equation. Russia’s combined oil, minerals and metals exports add up to 82 per cent of Exports in 2007 – this is up from 70 per cent in 2000.  Russia has over 239,000 kms of pipelines – which is the 2nd largest global pipeline network (122 kms condensate; 158,ooo kms gas; 72,000 kms oil and 13,600 kms for refined products). This pipeline network has political as well as economic clout. I recall a cartoon in Le Monde during a spat with Ukraine over gas prices. The caption read – “Beware the new Cold War! We can turn off the gas in October!” In terms of logistics – this is the major player and contrasts starkly with meagre container volumes. This is the challenge – how to diversify Russian logistics into the other modes effectively and efficiently.

There is one important caveat on any comparison with other BRIC economies. Where China, India and Brazil all use their Ports as the major export/import  mode; Russian EXIM activity is predominantly by road, rail and pipeline. The modal mix for each country (and region) is different. Equally, we have to factor in the nature of the products themselves and, again, Russia is quite different. Having made this point, business continuity is key to all supply chains and, Russian red tape does not inspire confidence. This is compounded by a simple observation. It is easier to process tonnes of oil moving through a pipeline than it is to scan through millions of TEUs or, break bulk cargo. Operationally and, from a security standpoint Russia has not enough to address this issue on the ground.

So much for physical movement of materials. Then, there is the lack of quality warehousing. A JonesLangLassale Report (2006) highlights that, in 2005, the price per square metre for quality warehousing was, at $135 per square metre, just below that of London. Then, there is the huge concentration of this capacity: Using 2006 figures; Moscow hosts 67 per cent of the quality storage capacity with St Petersburg on 11 per cent and the rest of the country combined at 22 per cent. This Moscow mania is true of all modes and, 56 per cent of all air cargo is handled through Moscow’s three airports.

Security will drive a fresh logistics agenda as, increasingly, import and export success will be a function of compliance with International security mandates. In turn, this will focus logistics attention on greater transparency and this will challenge those aspects of the economy that are characterised by informal practice. This Blog has covered this point elsewhere. This area is one of Russia’s major logistics challenges and should not be taken lightly by the government and trade associations. Success in tjhis area will have a direct impact upon FDI and, on raising the profile of Russia as a viable and secure trade hub or land bridge between Asia and the European Union. This is a significant prize.

The development of a Green Supply Chain perspective is increasingly relevant to markets such as Russia. This means developing procurement practices that encourage optimised use of ever more scarce natural resources. Closer working partnerships with producers can improve design and, champion alternative components and materials. In the physical movement of goods there are real opportunities in alternative fuels, optimised truck loads (and the reduction of empty running so characteristic of east west movements) and, a major reform of maintenance programmes to extend life time performance. Chernobyl is a stark reminder of the value of maintenance. Then, to close the loop, what can be done to explore more effective waste collection and reduce the cost of recycling. This green agenda can have a significant impact upon productivity and performance and these benefits need to be sold – especially to small business – as a way to improve the bottom line. For example, it is estimated (Emmett & Soud, 2010) that the Auto industry – a key player in Russia – can increase profitability by over 6 per cent through postponed manufacturing; design for disassembly; reduced costs of disposal and effective maintenance. And the opportunity to reduce the carbon footprint in all industries in a country with 11 time zones is a goal worth pursuing.

Above all, business culture – a tendency to test the rules rather than abide by them and, a lack of transparency – acts as a significant dampener on fragile FDI confidence. Equally, the dependency on the huge Corporates has been highlighted elsewhere and, Russia has to work much harder to create a more entrepreneurial business culture conducive to the growth of sustainable small businesses. Logistics can play a significant role in transforming their fortunes as hubs and more effective and efficient flows (Physical / Information / Cash and Skills) will create a more level playing field. Agriculture can develop into Agri Processing and, with this added value potential, become a driver of a more entrepreneurial rural economy. However, this is highly fragmented and fragile in the face of wider economic volatility and the heavy dependence on energy and commodity price fluctuations.

Until 2009, the market was growing over 10 per cent annually, but the financial crisis struck a serious blow to both logistics specialists and customers. The Russian logistics market lags behind its European counterpart because transportation and infrastructure remain gravely underdeveloped. Nevertheless, with the development of contract logistics, the growing turnover of the FMCG sector, the development of warehouses in the regions and the implementation of modern IT solutions, has renewed opportunity.

Russia needs to diversify its industrial base and this means developing more than oil and minerals. The volatility of world prices operates like a tide – when it is full it raises all boats but, when the tide is out – all boats are marooned. This will mean a significant expansion of the small enterprise sector and logistics (and general connectivity) can play a tremendous role in enabling and facilitating this strategy.

Retail and FMCG are acting as major catalysts for logistics and supply chain transformation. There is high growth potential in these sectors. The official Russian food retail market was valued at $146 billion in 2006, while the total market (including the “shadow” market) sttod at $233 billion – which means that the formal players capture 62 per cent of the total market size. Across all sectors, the modern formats account for about 15 per cent of total market size and the Top 10 companies in modern retail chains is over half – about 53 per cent – of the total market.

As elsewhere, the lack of skills across the board is a major constraint with an estimated 10 per cent of logistics vacancies being filled by qualified or experienced staff. There is a huge skills deficit that has to be filled by high impact training that is geared to improve supply chain performance and not just pad out individual CVs. For example, given the lack of investment in expensive materials handling equipment, the deployment of simulator training will be crucial. Simulation technology enables businesses to simulate accidents and generate real benefits to performance at no risk to scarce and hugely expensive assets. This is especially important given the huge geographies that businesses have to contend with.

So, where does T L fit into all of this? As indicated elsewhere, Transformational Logistics is an umbrella term for logistics in Emerging and Developing markets. Russia is a highly contrasted and nuanced market, characterised by both mature and transitional economies within the 11 time zones. It shares with other BRIC economies a sizeable population with increasing disposable income. There are significant regional and wealth discrepancies. Equally, infrastructure is in poor shape; materials handling capacity falls short of demand and skills provision and actual logistics competency has a long way to go. However, Russia has experienced a more volatile macro economic climate and has more to do to dispel concerns on business practice.

Transformational Logistics can be relevant as a catalyst to develop a clear understanding of the differences in key logistics and supply chain issues. For example, back to the flows (boxes; bucks; brains and bottlenecks):

  • Physical flow (boxes): Russia – like the other BRIC and emerging economies – is not a homogenous logistics market. When you consider that a typical Hypermarket deals with between 700 to 1500 suppliers and 50,000 SKUs you start to grasp the challenge. Each supplier will have a different logistics perspective and each product a unique “logistics (and carbon) footprint”. For example, there are perishables; home products; FMCG (fast moving commercial goods) and electrics to deal with. And let’s not forget reverse logistics and the increasing concerns caused by returned goods.
  • Information flow (bytes): Information has replaced inventory in many markets and Russia can make even more progress in this area. However, Enterprise Resource Software (such as SAP) is not the solution for all types of firm. Small companies do not have the resources to use the same software solutions as large Corporates. So, more needs to be done to explore what can be done within each industrial sector and for all types of business.
  • Multiple channels. This is a major challenge for all sorts of business. It is no longer enough to serve physical points of purchase – e business has changed all that. So, what is the logistics strategy to deal with this multiplicity of channels?
  • Cash flow (bucks): Small enterprises cannot cope with poor cash flow and, unlike the National and International Corporates, they need clarity and transparency for them to grow their business. Cash – not profitability – is key.
  • Labour (brains): Skilled logistics operators, managers and executives are needed all over the world and, with links to so many key markets Russia can play a major role in improving its own performance. It is not all about state-of-the-art assets. It is about behaviours and making things happen.
  • Constraints (bottlenecks): Where are the real challenges for Russian Logistics? They will differ by sector and, a closer look at operational and bureaucratic bottlenecks will enable us to build better ways to simplify, combine, integrate processes and, identify and deal with constraints.

None of the above can be handled in the same way across all 11 time zones and, few in the way that they are handled in the Developed economies. So, what can be done?

Transformational Logistics can be a catalyst to grow the necessary research agenda; develop Case Studies to share experience and build the operational toolkit and the competencies that can accelerate and deliver potential. T L  does not consider emerging or developing markets as simply a question of plug and play logistics and supply chain best practice from the developed world. Neither does T L claim to have all the answers – more a forum to raise and deal with questions relevant to an emerging market context. After all, not that long ago Russia was a Centrally planned and controlled economy with no experience of delivering consumer demand. Now, it has to do this ever better, cheaper and faster. It is time to draw from best practice from the Developed world but also, to help shape a logistics agenda more relevant to the middle ground identified in the LPI (2010). This is where Transformational Logistics comes in – a catalyst not a panacea.

SOURCES: World Development Indicators database; CIA World Factbook, 28 July 2005; All CIA World Factbooks 18 December 2003 to 18 December 2008; CIA World Factbook, 14 June, 2007 ; World standards on; CIA World Factbook, December 2003; United Nations World Statistics Pocketbook and Statistical Yearbook; Wikipedia: Norwegian car number plates ; CIA World Factbook, 22 August 2006 ; Wikipedia: Rail usage statistics by country ; Wikipedia: Rail usage statistics by country; Wikipedia: Speed limit ; CIA World Factbook, 28 July 2005 World Bank Global Development Indicators, 2001; World Bank, World Development Indicators 2001, Washington, DC: World Bank, 2001; Wikipedia: World Forum for Harmonization of Vehicle Regulations